Tasfia Tarannum Prova
Introduction
In recent years, Bangladesh has entered a
troubling phase where accusations of blasphemy though not legally defined as a
standalone offence have been operationalised with increasing severity through a
mixture of colonial era criminal provisions and modern digital laws. This trend
has not only emboldened extrajudicial vigilantism but also cultivated an
environment of fear, censorship, and legal uncertainty. While Bangladesh does
not possess a formal blasphemy statute akin to Pakistan’s notorious Section
295C, the country effectively operates a de facto blasphemy regime.
This article critically examines the legal architecture facilitating such
prosecutions, highlights key cases including that of Professor Sohel Hasan
Galib, and investigates how the convergence of majoritarian religious
sentiment, populist political pressures, and ill defined legal standards is
eroding Bangladesh’s constitutional guarantees of free speech and religious
freedom. It also interrogates the ways in which the blasphemy narrative
disproportionately threatens minorities and stifles dissent.
The Legal Foundations of Criminalised
Blasphemy in Bangladesh
Although the Penal Code of 1860 predates
Bangladesh's independence and was designed under colonial rule to maintain
communal harmony, its residual provisions particularly Sections 295, 295A, and
298 continue to serve as instruments of coercion. These sections criminalise
acts intended to insult religion or wound religious sentiments, but their vague
wording and lack of definitional clarity create fertile ground for arbitrary
application. For example, Section 295A punishes deliberate and malicious acts intended
to outrage religious feelings, but fails to define what constitutes an outrage
or how malice is judicially determined. The consequences are dire: religious
criticism, satire, or even scholarly commentary may be construed as criminal
offences based on subjective interpretations by law enforcement or an inflamed
public.
This outdated legal regime was effectively
modernised and magnified through digital laws, first with the now repealed
Section 57 of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act, and more
recently under Section 28 of the Digital Security Act (DSA) 2018. The DSA
stipulates up to ten years of imprisonment for digital expressions deemed to
hurt religious values or sentiments, with repeat offences punishable by life
imprisonment. In March 2023, the DSA was nominally replaced by the Cyber
Security Act (CSA), but the substantive provisions remain nearly identical.
These offences are nonbailable, giving police and prosecutors extraordinary
powers to detain individuals without adequate judicial oversight. The fusion of
archaic religious offences with technologically expansive surveillance powers
has led to the systematic criminalisation of thought and creativity under the
guise of preserving communal harmony.
The Case of Professor Sohel Hasan Galib:
Literature on Trial
One of the most troubling demonstrations of this
legal apparatus in action is the arrest of Professor Sohel Hasan Galib in
February 2025. Galib, a prominent poet, academic, and cultural figure, was
detained under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and later
investigated for allegedly hurting religious sentiments through his poetry
collection Amar Khutba Guli. His detention without bail, interrogation
by the Detective Branch, and suspension from his post at the National Academy
for Educational Management reveal the far-reaching and chilling consequences of
a system willing to equate literary critique with religious offence. That
Galib, known for his advocacy of interreligious dialogue, could be so swiftly
persecuted suggests a legal climate where nuance and intention are rendered
irrelevant. His case was met with public outcry by intellectuals, writers, and
civil society groups, who rightly stressed that in any democracy, ideas must be
countered by ideas, not by incarceration.
Galib’s persecution is not an isolated incident,
but a symptomatic expression of a growing pattern. In early 2025, a university
student accused of commenting on the Prophet Muhammad’s marriage was publicly
assaulted and paraded inside a police station was widely circulated on social
media to cheers from self appointed moral guardians. Similarly, Hindu
minorities have repeatedly faced violence and police inaction in the wake of
unfounded blasphemy allegations. The torching of homes in Magura in May 2024 and
the brutal beating of teenager Utsav Mondal in Khulna exemplify how the
criminalisation of religious offence fuels communal vigilantism while state
authorities stand complicit or passive. These cases highlight not only the
flaws in legal enforcement but also the chilling complicity of state
institutions in emboldening majoritarian dominance through both silence and
action.
Judicial Endorsement and the Rise of
Religious Populism
The judiciary, far from serving as a bulwark
against populist overreach, has in some cases actively encouraged the expansion
of the blasphemy regime. In March 2024, a division bench of the High Court
called upon the legislature to criminalise religious offences under cyber laws
with death or life sentences and to make such crimes non bailable. Although not
binding, such pronouncements carry significant symbolic weight and reveal how
judicial rhetoric is increasingly animated by theological populism rather than
constitutional fidelity. The ghost of Pakistan’s Section 295C hovers ominously,
and calls for codifying blasphemy as a capital crime are no longer confined to
the margins. These developments underscore the judiciary’s vulnerability to
majoritarian pressure and the erosion of constitutional norms in favour of
religious orthodoxy.
The political exploitation of blasphemy
allegations is hardly new in Bangladesh. The 2013 Shapla Square protests led by
Hefazat-e-Islam demanding blasphemy laws, punishment of atheist bloggers, and
curbs on women’s rights signalled the state’s tacit acceptance of the
theological street as a legitimate political force. Subsequent governments have
responded to similar protests with appeasement rather than assertion of
constitutional principles. In April 2025, the vandalism of Rabindranath
Tagore’s ancestral home by Islamist vigilantes was barely condemned by
officials, a silence that speaks volumes. Such acts of cultural iconoclasm
reveal the broader agenda behind blasphemy politics: the erasure of pluralism
and the imposition of a singular religious narrative enforced by law,
intimidation, or both.
Majoritarian Sentiment and the
Suppression of Religious Minorities
The intense religious sentiment of Bangladesh’s
Muslim majority, comprising over 90% of the population, plays a significant
role in shaping state responses to alleged blasphemy. Reverence for Prophet
Muhammad is central to Islamic belief and identity, and perceived insults to
the Prophet often trigger deep emotional responses. These sentiments are not
merely personal or theological but have become politicised tools wielded for
public mobilisation. Political parties often walk a tightrope, wary of antagonising
religious leaders or populist sentiment, leading to ambivalent or appeasing
policy responses.
However, this majoritarian sentiment, when
encoded into legal practice, poses grave threats to religious minorities. The
vague phrasing of blasphemy-related provisions enables their weaponisation
against Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and indigenous peoples. The Khulna and
Magura incidents, where blasphemy allegations precipitated violence against
minority communities, illustrate this trend. These laws provide majoritarian
groups with a convenient pretext to launch attacks under the guise of religious
protection. Furthermore, minorities rarely find recourse in the criminal
justice system. Police often fail to investigate violence or protect victims,
and courts are reluctant to take a stand against public outrage, perpetuating a
culture of impunity and fear.
Constitutional Dissonance and
International Human Rights Law
The criminalisation of blasphemy in Bangladesh
starkly contradicts its constitutional commitments. Article 39 guarantees
freedom of expression, while Article 41 ensures freedom of religion, including
the right to profess, practice, and propagate one’s faith. The 15th Amendment
to the Constitution reaffirmed secularism as a state principle. Yet, the
state’s legal and political actions reflect an ever-widening gulf between
constitutional text and administrative reality. The enforcement of
blasphemy-related provisions prioritises religious sentiment over individual
liberty, thereby converting a secular republic into an enforcer of religious
morality.
Bangladesh is also in breach of its international
obligations. Under Article 19 and Article 18 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Bangladesh is a party, the rights
to freedom of expression and religion are protected and can only be limited
under strict conditions of necessity and proportionality. General Comment No.
34 of the UN Human Rights Committee makes it explicit that blasphemy laws per
se are incompatible with these obligations unless they meet a high threshold of
direct incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence. The broad
criminalisation of religious offence in Bangladesh does not meet this
threshold, and repeated UN recommendations to revise or repeal problematic laws
have gone unheeded.
Civil Society Resistance and the
Shrinking Space for Dissent
Despite a hostile environment, Bangladesh’s civil
society has resisted the drift toward authoritarian religiosity. The outpouring
of support for Professor Galib from PEN Bangladesh to university students and
academics reflects a steadfast commitment to freedom of thought. Yet, this
resistance is met with increasing repression. Writers, journalists, and human
rights defenders face arrest, surveillance, and online harassment.
Self-censorship is pervasive, not only among public intellectuals but also
within the media and academic institutions. The state’s response has not been
to address underlying grievances but to suppress them more forcefully.
The blasphemy discourse is, therefore, not only a
legal issue but also a cultural one, tied to the broader questions of national
identity, pluralism, and the kind of democracy Bangladesh aspires to be. In a
climate where public morality is policed and theological populism rewarded, the
lines between law and mob rule blur dangerously.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Bangladesh stands at a critical juncture. If it
wishes to remain a secular democracy committed to human rights and pluralism,
it must decisively reject the trajectory of blasphemy criminalisation. This
requires the immediate repeal or radical narrowing of Penal Code Sections 295,
295A, and 298, alongside the reform or repeal of digital statutes such as
Section 28 of the Cyber Security Act. The state must draw clear legal
distinctions between speech that merely offends and speech that incites
violence or constitutes hate crime. Judges must be trained to uphold
constitutional principles even in the face of public pressure, and law
enforcement must be held accountable for enabling mob violence. Public
education and interfaith dialogue can foster tolerance and reduce the
inflammatory potential of online speech. Finally, Bangladesh must heed
international calls to bring its laws in line with the ICCPR and protect its
citizens not from ideas, but from persecution in the name of ideas.
The choice is stark but clear: either retreat
further into religious authoritarianism, or reclaim the constitutional vision
of a secular, inclusive, and democratic society. The path Bangladesh takes will
shape not just its legal future, but the fate of its pluralistic soul.