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Md.Mahamudun Noby Rupok
1. Introduction
Assumed to be in charge of preserving
world peace and security, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is still
among the most potent organs of the UN. But its structure and decision-making
procedures, mostly molded by the geopolitical reality of 1945, have drawn more
and more criticism. Comprising fifteen members—five permanent members
(P5—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—each
wielding veto power—the UNSC is. The ten others are chosen alternately for
two-year terms. Though they only represent a small portion of the world's
population, the P5 control the most important decisions on military operations,
sanctions, and peacekeeping.
2.
Legal
Framework of the UNSC
The UN Charter, especially in Chapters
V–VII, lays the UNSC's legal basis. The Charter's Article 23(1) specifies the
membership composition; Article 27 details voting processes, including the
controversial veto mechanism. Any reform must thus inevitably involve changing
the UN Charter under Article 108, which calls for a two-thirds vote in the
General Assembly, including the consent of every P5 member. This need generates
a major legal obstacle since any one P5 member can stop changes meant to reduce
their influence.
3.
The Case
for Reform
Representatives
of UNSC reform contend that the present system does not reflect the demographic
reality of the twenty-first century or geopolitics. Having 54 member states,
Africa lacks permanent representation. Likewise, despite their great
contributions to UN peacekeeping and global governance, major economies
including India, Brazil, and Japan are not permanently members. Furthermore,
the veto power has been applied irregularly and frequently to protect close
acquaintances, so compromising the legitimacy and neutrality of the Council.
Important needs for reform include: - increase of both permanent and
non-permanent seats. Abolition or constraint of the veto authority. More
underdeveloped nations, especially from Africa and Latin America, are
represented. Improved openness and responsibility in Council operations.
4. Political Challenges
Although the
majority believe that reform is necessary, they cannot agree on how to go about
implementing it. Among the most well-known suggestions are: G4 Proposal: This
plan, which is supported by Brazil, Japan, India, and Germany, calls for these
countries to have permanent seats, with or without the ability to veto. Group
for Uniting for Consensus (UFC): This group, which is led by nations like South
Korea, Pakistan, and Italy, is against the creation of more permanent seats and
in favor of more non-permanent ones. The Ezulwini Consensus of the African
Union: Demands that African nations have full veto power and at least two
permanent and five non-permanent seats. The political intricacy of reform is
demonstrated by these conflicting visions. In general, current permanent
members are hesitant to give up their influence.
China
opposes Japan's admission, for example, because of historical and regional
conflicts; Russia and the United States have displayed reluctance about
increasing the Council's permanent membership. Moreover, regional rivalries can
obstruct cohesive plans. For instance, Argentina challenges Brazil's claim to a
permanent seat, and Pakistan opposes India's ambition.
5.
Legal
Challenges and Charter Amendment Process
Only five
amendments have been made to the UN Charter since 1945, demonstrating the
extreme difficulty of legal reform. Article 108 requires ratification by all P5
members in addition to a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. Given
that any significant reform would probably impact the P5's interests, this dual
requirement serves as an almost insurmountable obstacle. The extent of
acceptable reforms is the subject of another legal dispute. Without completely
renegotiating the fundamental tenets of the UN, would it be legally possible to
restrict or eliminate the veto power? There are differences among legal
scholars. While some contend that political will could enable reinterpretation
rather than revision, others argue that the veto is so fundamental to the
UNSC's structure that its removal would necessitate an extensive reconstruction
of the Charter.
6.
Alternative
Avenues for Reform
Due to the challenge of transforming the Charter, some
academics and diplomats support "soft reform" initiatives like: -
Ø P5
members' voluntary refraining from exercising their veto power in cases of mass
atrocities (as suggested by the French-Mexican initiative).
Ø Improving the General Assembly's ability to
hold the UNSC responsible.
Ø Enhancing
regional representation by allocating non-permanent seats in a creative manner.
These strategies might be used as stopgap measures to
increase the Council's legitimacy and responsiveness, even though they don't
address fundamental structural flaws.
7.
Conclusion
One of the
most difficult problems in international law and diplomacy is still UNSC
reform. Notwithstanding the compelling normative case for reform, which is
based on the ideas of efficacy, equality, and justice, there are significant
political and legal obstacles. A paradox arises from the P5's need for
consensus: those who stand to gain the most from the status quo must consent to
reduce their own influence. However, mounting dissatisfaction with the UNSC's
inaction in the face of international crises, like the wars in Gaza, Ukraine,
and Syria, might eventually generate the political momentum required for
reform. In the interim, efforts ought to concentrate on forming alliances,
encouraging communication, and investigating small-scale changes that respect
the UN Charter's spirit, if not the way it is stated
References
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations
(adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.
Bardo Fassbender, 'The United Nations Charter
as the Constitution of the International Community' (2009) 36(1) Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 529.
Edward C Luck, *UN Security Council: Practice
and Promise* (Routledge 2006).
Security Council Report, 'Veto Initiative and
Security Council Reform' (2023).
African Union, 'Ezulwini Consensus' (2005).
UN General Assembly Res 62/557 (2008).
Author’s Detail
Md.Mahamudun Noby Rupok
Lecturer and Head (Acting)
Department of Law and Justice
North East University Bangladesh, Sylhet.