 |
| Setu Kumar Rai |
The
“weaponization of refugee flows” refers to the deliberate creation,
manipulation, or direction of mass displacement of people to achieve strategic
objectives. As Kelly Greenhill explains, such “strategically engineered
migrations” are state- or group-driven population movements “deliberately
created or manipulated in the service of domestic and/or international
political, economic, or military objectives”. In practice, weaker actors often
exploit refugee movements as a form of coercion against stronger states or
rivals. States may mass-displace or threaten displacement of civilians to
extract concessions (the “coercive engineered migration” category), to fortify
their own political support (e.g. expelling dissidents), or to reshape ethnic
demographics (ethnic cleansing). For example, states have used refugees as
bargaining chips in negotiations: after luring migrants into Belarus and
letting them cross into EU countries in 2021, Lukashenko’s regime aimed “to
punish and embarrass” the European Union and extract concessions for lifting
sanctions. Similarly, Turkey’s repeated threats to to Europe underscored how Syria’s displaced
have become “a fundamental feature” of EU–Turkey relations, enabling Ankara to
win billions of euros and political concessions.
Case
Studies of Deliberate Flow
Syrian
Civil War (2011–present) and EU–Turkey tensions:
The Syrian conflict generated one of history’s largest refugee crises. Multiple
parties exploited displacement: all sides used forced flight to weaken
opponents, but most notably Turkey used Syrian refugees as leverage against
Europe. By 2016, with over 3 million Syrians in Turkey, Erdoğan repeatedly
implied he could “open the doors” to Europe unless paid and supported. A March
2016 EU–Turkey deal was struck only after thinly-veiled threats from Turkey to
trigger mass migration, illustrating how Syrian refugee flows were “weaponized”
for political concessions. As Greenhill observes, many Syrians in Turkey became
“pawns” in Turkey’s efforts since 2015 to coerce EU concessions on visas, aid,
and accession talks. At the same time, Russia has been accused of orchestrating
displacement inside Ukraine (and outside) for strategic ends. Reports of tens
of thousands of civilians forcibly deported from Mariupol and other areas into
Russia suggest a deliberate campaign to empty cities of Ukrainians – a
practice condemned as a gross violation of law.
Kosovo
War (1998–1999): During Serbia’s campaign in Kosovo,
forced displacement was a key tool of ethnic cleansing. The ICTY has treated
the mass expulsion of Kosovars as part of a joint criminal enterprise to
alter the region’s ethnic balance. In its 2014 judgment, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber confirmed that Serbian police and officials committed deportation and
“other inhumane acts (forcible transfer)” on a vast scale, explicitly designed
to make Kosovo “Serb-controlled”. These actions were prosecuted as crimes
against humanity and war crimes (e.g. deportation, forcible transfer, and
persecutions) under the ICTY Statute. The Kosovo example underscores that
weaponizing refugees – here through ethnic cleansing – not only inflicts
immense human suffering, but also violates IHL and international criminal law.
Bangladesh–Myanmar
(Rohingya crisis): Myanmar’s 2017
“clearance operations” in Rakhine State provide another illustration, albeit
less openly strategic. The military campaign forced roughly 700,000 Rohingya
Muslims to flee to Bangladesh. While framed domestically as counterinsurgency,
rights groups see it as an ethnic-cleansing drive (one UN report cites
“genocidal intent”). The sudden mass exodus destabilized the region; Bangladesh
has struggled with the humanitarian and security impacts. Although Myanmar’s
intent appears aimed at expelling a minority population (rather than directly
negotiating with Bangladesh), the outcome—mass refugee flows—nonetheless became
a political issue. Bangladesh has at times threatened to push back refugees or
suspend aid, while Myanmar has demanded action on repatriation as a diplomatic
quid pro quo. Thus, the Rohingya case, even if not classic “coercion of another
state,” shows how deliberate state-driven displacement can produce regional
crises that actors might then manipulate for political effect.
Ukraine-Russia
War (2022–): After Russia’s full-scale invasion
in 2022, millions of Ukrainians fled abroad. Beyond natural warflight, evidence
indicates Moscow also forcibly transferred civilians to Russia and even
reclassified them as “refugees.” These transfers violate the Geneva
Conventions’ ban on deporting protected persons and have drawn international
condemnation. The ICC’s arrest warrants against President Putin and
Commissioner Lvova-Belova for “unlawful deportation and transfer of children”
underscore that mass removals are treated as war crimes and potentially as acts
with genocidal character. At the same time, Ukraine has complained that Russia
dangles discussions of releasing prisoners in exchange for cessation of refugee
flows – a form of coercion. While this crisis is ongoing, it highlights how
powerful states can manipulate refugee movements as part of their war aims and
negotiation strategies.
Legal
Analysis: IHL and Refugee Law
International
Humanitarian Law (IHL): Under the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols,
civilians have robust protections during armed conflict. The Fourth Geneva
Convention (GC IV) explicitly forbids “individual or mass forcible transfers,
as well as deportations” of protected persons from occupied territory (Art.
49). Additional Protocol I (applicable in international conflicts) likewise
criminalizes “the transfer or deportation of civilian population” as a war
crime (Art. 85(4)(a) and Rome Statute Art. 8(2)(a)(vii)). In practice, these
rules mean any belligerent that displaces civilians for reasons unrelated to
genuine security or imperative military necessity is committing a grave breach
of IHL (a war crime). The ICRC’s customary law study confirms that forcible
displacement is expressly prohibited under all circumstances, absent narrow
exceptions. Moreover, IHL bans indirect methods of causing refugees: Article 51
of AP I prohibits attacks “the primary purpose of which is to spread terror”
among civilians, and Article 54 forbids depriving civilians of essentials “to
cause them to move away”. All parties must also allow and facilitate civilians
to receive humanitarian aid and to evacuate danger zones, without using such
movements to shield military operations. In short, any coerced refugee flight
caused by violence, threat, or deprivation is contrary to IHL. Indeed, IHL
envisages that civilians are protected not just from direct attack but also
from being used as pawns – including being herded en masse toward a border to
pressure an adversary. International criminal law reinforces these
prohibitions.
The
ICC Rome Statute lists “deportation or forcible transfer of population” as a
crime against humanity when done “as part of a widespread or systematic attack”
on civilians (Art. 7(1)(d)), and likewise as a war crime (Art. 8). The ICTY
Statute similarly criminalized unlawful deportation or transfer (Art. 2(g)) and
included deportation and forcible transfer in the list of crimes against
humanity (Art. 5(d)). In practice, tribunals have prosecuted mass displacement
as both war crimes and crimes against humanity when evidence shows it was
organized and targeted at a civilian group. For example, the ICTY ruled that
displacing civilians is always traumatic, violating the victims’ most
fundamental rights. The appeals chamber in the Stakić case underscored that “displacement
for humanitarian reasons” is permissible only when not caused by the displacing
party’s own unlawful conduct. Thus, under present law, intentionally
engineering refugee flows for coercion can amount to a war crime or crime
against humanity – but only individual perpetrators (e.g. military or political
leaders) are subject to prosecution under these regimes. Refugee Law: The 1951
Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol create obligations for States toward
refugees (persons outside their country fearing persecution). Notably, Article
33’s non-refoulement principle bans expelling or returning a refugee “to
frontiers where [his/her] life or freedom would be threatened” on account of
race, religion, nationality, etc. (customary international law).
Refugee
Law
The
1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol create obligations for States toward
refugees (persons outside their country fearing persecution). Notably,
Article 33’s non-refoulement principle bans expelling or returning
a refugee “to frontiers where [his/her] life or freedom would be threatened” on
account of race, religion, nationality, etc. (customary international law. It
also (implicitly) places duties on transit or destination states to admit
people who meet the refugee definition, since states cannot be forced to accept
outsiders beyond non-refoulement obligations. Other provisions grant refugees
certain rights (access to courts, work, etc.) and require cooperation with
UNHCR. However, the Refugee Convention contains no rule obliging States to
prevent refugees from being used as tools of coercion, nor does it impose
penalties on perpetrators of forced displacement. As one analyst notes, the
Convention is “silent on the question of state or individual accountability”
for causing forced migration. There is no enforcement body (like a treaty
committee) to sanction abuse of refugee flows. Moreover, while non-refoulement
is absolute, many States have sought to limit asylum access through
externalization or border push-backs. In practice, the refugee regime relies on
political goodwill and peer pressure. Consequently, victims of weaponized
displacement often find that traditional refugee law offers them little
remedy against the coercing actor, and hosts tend to see them as security
threats rather than innocent asylum-seekers.
State
Responsibility and Enforcement Limits:
When states deliberately cause forced displacement, breaches of IHL and
humanitarian law occur, but holding them accountable faces hurdles.
Perpetrators can in theory be prosecuted by international tribunals (ICC,
ICTY/IRMCT, etc.) as noted above. However, many coercing states (e.g. Russia,
Myanmar) are not ICC members or have not cooperated with international justice.
States can also be held internationally responsible under general law of state
responsibility for breaches of IHL treaties – but enforcement via diplomatic or
legal channels is weak. For example, Bosnia sued Serbia at the ICJ for genocide
(which includes forced transfer as a genocidal act), but overall ICJ
jurisprudence on displacement remains limited. Regional courts like the ECHR
have affirmed non-refoulement as part of the right to life (e.g. Chahal v.
UK) but have not tackled cases of interstate coercive migration. In
short, accountability for weaponizing refugees tends to fall through the
gaps between IHL (focused on conflict) and refugee law (focused on protection),
so few mechanisms exist to punish the coercers. The international community
usually resorts to political measures – sanctions, condemnation, humanitarian
aid – which at best respond to the symptoms of displacement, not to its
weaponization as such.
Legal
and Policy Recommendations
Preventing
and responding to the weaponization of refugee flows will require both legal
reforms and practical measures. Experts suggest that the international
community should explicitly recognize mass forced displacement as a
punishable atrocity. One proposal is to amend the Rome Statute (and allied
doctrines) to criminalize “mass forced displacement” as a distinct
international crime. This would mirror how the crime of aggression was added to
the Statute and how R2P (Responsibility to Protect) now names ethnic cleansing
as an atrocity. By codifying mass forced displacement under ICC
jurisdiction and R2P, coercers would face clearer legal jeopardy. Similarly,
advocates argue for interpreting existing IHL to cover weaponization
explicitly: states should engage in “lawfare” to develop state practice
condemning migrant flows as a war crime. In the meantime, ad hoc tribunals (or
the ICC) could emphasize in indictments and judgments that organized
large-scale displacement for coercion violates both the laws of war and human rights.
On
the refugee law side, reforms could aim to bridge the accountability gap. For
example, UNHCR or the UN General Assembly could pursue resolutions declaring
that using refugees as leverage contravenes international law, and urge states
to bar transit arrangements that endanger asylum-seekers. A binding
international framework for burden-sharing – though difficult politically –
might reduce the leverage coercers gain by exploiting the reluctance of
destination states to absorb sudden inflows. More modestly, states could
tighten asylum screening to target malign actors (e.g. smugglers working with
hostile regimes) while safeguarding genuine refugees, combined with financial
or visa incentives to partners who resist migrant-baiting schemes.
Ultimately,
the key is deterrence through law and policy. If the international community
makes clear that weaponizing refugee flows will trigger legal consequences
(e.g. sanctions, ICC indictments) and swift humanitarian countermeasures,
coercers might think twice. As one commentator argues, treating migrant
weaponization as armed aggression could even justify defensive measures. While
no single reform can eliminate this tactic, a combination of clarifying legal
norms, strengthening enforcement, and improving refugee protection regimes can
reduce the appeal and success of using displaced people as weapons of war.
References
Greenhill,
K. M. (2010). Weapons of mass migration: Forced displacement, coercion, and
foreign policy. Cornell University Press.
Orchard, P. (2021). International, regional, and domestic mechanisms to hold
states to account for the causes of forced displacement. UNHCR Legal
Materials.
Rakov, D., & Fainberg, S. (2023). The growing impact of the civilian
population on the modern battlefield: A glimpse into the Russia-Ukraine war.
Tel Aviv University.
Schmitt, M. N. (2022). Deportation of Ukrainian civilians to Russia: The legal
framework. Lawfare.
Various Authors (2018). Enhancing refugee protection through the
criminalization of “mass forced displacement”. Refugee Law Initiative Blog.
United Nations (1949). Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War. International Committee of the Red Cross.
United Nations (1951). Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
Protocol (1967). UN High Commissioner for Refugees.