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| Kazi Ayman Awsaf |
Although
Bangladesh has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, it
remains at the forefront of one of the most pressing humanitarian crises of our
time—the Rohingya issue. These Rohingya refugees-who number in excess of one
million-have found shelter in Bangladesh since the military counterinsurgency
operation in Rakhine State, Myanmar, in 2017. This unprecedented displacement
has exposed the tension between state sovereignty and international
humanitarian obligations, putting Bangladesh in a delicate legal and diplomatic
situation.
Legal
Framework and Humanitarian Commitment
While
Bangladesh has not ratified the Refugee Convention 1951, its practice remains
mostly compliant with the core principles of international refugee law,
especially in relation to non-refoulement under Article 33. According to Article 33(1),
principle of non-refoulement is offered to refuse refugee return to any person
facing a reasonably possible threat to life or freedom. The law came to be
considered as a treaty but now it has attained the status of Customary
International Law that binds all States, enactment or non-ratification
notwithstanding. Bangladesh has still followed this rule in general by giving
the Rohingya temporary protection for humanitarian reasons. This approach
showcases how non-signatories can actually give effect to fundamental
humanitarian standards through goodwill and moral commitment.
From
the humanitarian side, Bangladesh is commended for mass admission and providing
meager shelter with limited access to services to the refugees. Though from a
refugee law perspective, in the lack of legal recognition, access to refugees
to the bundle of rights provided under the 1951 Convention is somewhat
curtailed. These rights include the right not to be penalized for illegal entry
(Art. 31), submission to courts (Art. 16), public relief (Art. 23), primary
education (Art. 22), and wage-earning employment (Art. 17), among others. Registration
and documentation of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh through UNHCR measures
have significantly assisted the refugees, but such measures have no
enforceability by law and cannot replace the establishment of statutory refugee
regulations into domestic laws.
Such
absence—in refugee law—turns refugees into a legal limbo, sans formal
recognition, work permitted, and opportunities for integration. Their legal
vulnerability is further worsened by Bangladesh's concerns over legitimate
issues of national security, economic burden, and the long-term consequences
that might entail from hosting a stateless population.
The
Regional and Global Gap in Refugee Protection
In
the South Asian context, regional cooperation remains conspicuously absent. Unlike
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which, despite its flaws, provides a
regional mechanism for coordination, standardization, and redistribution of
asylum responsibilities, South Asia lacks any corresponding legal
infrastructure. The broader international response has been similarly
fragmented. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has
failed to establish any binding refugee protection regime. Neighboring states
have largely refrained from offering meaningful support or resettlement,
leaving Bangladesh to shoulder the burden alone. Despite rhetorical support for burden-sharing and
refugee rights, few countries have committed to large-scale resettlement or
sustainable solutions.
Yet,
Bangladesh has remained engaged in multilateral efforts. It has worked with
UNHCR and international agencies, supported investigations by the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and actively
raised the issue at the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council. These
initiatives reflect a proactive legal diplomacy, aimed at compelling
accountability and creating conditions for eventual repatriation.
Repatriation:
Law, Diplomacy, and Roadblocks
Repatriation
under international refugee law is not simply a physical return but proceeds as
a legal process within the highly complicated system of evolving human rights
norms, state obligations, and international oversight mechanisms. Voluntary
repatriation, local integration, and third-country resettlement are the three
so-called durable solutions under the law, with first being often an option
politically preferred by host states, as it appears to carry finality upon
return. However, refugee law lays down certain fundamental requirements for
repatriation, which must be observed while carrying out any act of
repatriation: it must be undertaken on voluntary basis, in safety and with
dignity.
These
standards derive their authority from international refugee instruments, with
the major ones being the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
the 1967 Protocol. Bangladesh is not a state party to these two treaties, but
its respect for the principle of non-refoulement in Article 33(1) has set the
country as a practitioner of the customary international law binding upon even
the non-parties. This principle prescribes that such forcible return be
prohibited where life or liberty is threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. Therefore, repatriation becomes refoulement in law when it is under
duress and contrary to assurances therein, and it constitutes a violation of an
international obligation.
As
refugee law explains, voluntariness cannot simply be conceived as consent but
rather as an informed and free decision made on the basis of properly dispensed
information about the conditions prevailing in the country of origin. The UNHCR
Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation (1996) states that consideration should be
given to those who return under threat of hardship, fear, or lack of
alternatives. Refugees must be granted legal assurance to restore their
nationality, to have access to civil documentation, and to be able to move
freely, among other rights protective measures from persecution. Failing
relationship with any of the preconditions renders repatriation irregular.
International
law requires that deportation must be carried out voluntarily and with safety
and dignity. Following this standard, Bangladesh has maintained that no return
of Rohingya should be forced. Repatriation in Bangladesh has taken the form of
several bilateral and multilateral initiatives. The 2017 “Arrangement on Return
of Displaced Persons” was signed between Bangladesh and Myanmar, with a
subsequent “Physical Arrangement” to operationalize voluntary return. These
were further supplemented through a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2018
between Myanmar, UNHCR, and UNDP to implement reintegration in Rakhine State.
These mechanisms, however, have never yielded productive outcomes, primarily
because Myanmar itself refuses to produce verifiable conditions for safe
return. The multiple initiatives for repatriation during 2018 and 2019 broke down
entirely after Rohingya refugees refused to cooperate, citing fear for their
safety on grounds of unresolved persecution and non-crisis of nationality.
In
2025, the diplomatic initiative renewed in Bangladesh during the interim
Government of the Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus as Chief Adviser. Dr. Yunus
emphasized the crisis as a regional humanitarian emergency, beyond Bangladesh's
sole responsibility. In China, at the Boao Forum, he invited Asian leaders to
take collective responsibility in treating the matter. His meetings with the
military chief of Myanmar, with the Malaysian Prime Minister, and with others
indicate that high-level efforts are underway in search of durable solutions. In
a positive diplomatic signal, albeit cautious, Myanmar's agreement to arrange
for the return of 180,000 persons and to look into the identity verification of
some 500,000 more shows movement.
These
efforts could be equated with the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P)
principle—that if a state is unwilling or unable to shield its population from
persecution, then it is in the interest of the international community to
intervene. Bangladesh's approach really means to activate such a global
principle under a tenuous set of regional arrangements.
Obstacles
and the Path Ahead
Despite
diplomatic momentum, major obstacles remain. The root problem remains that
Myanmar still does not grant citizenship to the Rohingya, and thus any
repatriation is premature. Return without legal status and security guarantees
is neither safe nor voluntary. Bangladesh's economy, environment, and social
fabric are increasingly being strained. Refugee camps remain overcrowded, while
humanitarian aid keeps dwindling.
Anomalously,
Bangladesh has positioned itself legally and diplomatically as a non-signatory
state that fronts the global humanitarian response, with no enforceable
international obligations. This anomaly cuts deeper into a structural failure
within the international refugee regime—where legal instruments are deemed
inadequate to ensure fair burden sharing.
Conclusion
The
Bangladesh experience in the Rohingya crisis, as it is sometimes lamented,
offers a grave lesson on how refugee protection is shifting. It shows how
states can take a position of moral leadership even when the binding treaties
are nonexistent. Yet, to make this commitment viable, national and global
mechanisms must undergo change. It is evident that Bangladesh desperately needs
a domestic refugee law aligned with international standards. Regionally, South
Asia needs to work on the adoption of a common refugee regime. While, at the
global level, the UN and donor governments should convert their verbal promises
into concrete actions: resettlement, funding, and diplomatic pressure on
Myanmar.
Given
that climate change and political instability are already causing far-reaching
displacement, Bangladesh’s attempt to balance sovereignty with responsibility
may well become that model—or that warning—for all other countries. To prevent
the prolonged denial of citizenship and the establishment of justice, refugee
law must certainly exist and must be operational.