Abubakar Muhammad Jibril |
Introduction
IHL is grounded in the universal principle of alleviating human
suffering amid the realities of armed conflict. Although IHL's minimum
standards are established in the situation of international wars, their
extension to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) constitutes one of the
biggest challenges for global humanitarian governance.The Nigerian situation
clearly illustrates this confrontation. Nigeria has endured chronic internal
conflict for over twenty years, including Boko Haram's militant insurgency in
the Northeast, recurring conflict between pastoralists and farmers in central
areas, and rampant banditry throughout the Northwest.The civilians are usually
in between the combatants, with displacement, extra-judicial killings, and loss
of their property. Despite Nigeria's obligations under IHL in law, protection
of civilians during such NIACs continues to be confronted with serious
implementation gaps. This article critically explores how IHL attempts to
safeguard civilians in Nigeria's internal armed conflicts and identifies
lessons for bridging the gap between law and practice.
Understanding the Legal Framework
Armed conflicts that occur exclusively within the territorial
borders of a state, known as non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), are
governed by fundamental principles of International Humanitarian Law. Article 3
is a foundational norm, which is applied without distinction to all four Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol II of 1977. This basic article enunciates
the minimum humanitarian obligations that must be adhered to by state armed
forces and by organized armed groups. It provides that all individuals not
participating in hostilities are treated humanely and specifically prohibits
acts of murder, torture, or inhuman treatment. In addition, Protocol II more
fully elaborates this model with additional detailed protections for internal
conflict; its applicability, however, is restricted to those situations where
the parties to the conflict demonstrate a requisite degree of organization and
control.
Nigeria has given legal effect to the four Geneva agreements and
has likewise adopted the Second Additional Protocol. Additionally, customary
IHL norms founded upon consistent state practice and legal opinion complement
these treaty obligations. At the domestic level, Nigeria's 1999 Constitution
establishes fundamental human rights, At the local level, Nigeria's
counter-insurgency operations are guided by some of the most important
instruments, like the amended Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 and the Armed
Forces Act, that collectively offer the legal basis for military intervention
and internal security operations. Translating such legal norms into practical
protection for civilians has however been extremely challenging.
Core Principles and Their Challenges
Three core principles under IHL are central to safeguarding
civilians: distinction, proportionality, and precaution.
·
Distinction requires every party involved in hostilities to
separate civilians from fighters and to confine attacks strictly to legitimate
military targets.
·
Proportionality bars attacks if the expected civilian damage would
outweigh the concrete military gain to be achieved.
·
Precaution requires that utmost precautions be taken to prevent or
avoid incidental civilian harm.
In theory, they offer strong protection. In practice, though, the
Nigerian example demonstrates chronic shortfalls.
Nigeria's Experience: Protection in Practice
Boko Haram Insurgency: Boko Haram's armed conflict has targeted,
since 2009, civilians with bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations. Such
high-profile atrocities as the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls highlight
the group's blatant disregard for IHL and human rights law.
State Response: The Nigerian Military has launched mass military
campaigns against Boko Haram and other armed groups. Although lawful under IHL,
credible reports from human rights actors have established that there have been
some situations where the actions of security forces have fallen below the
expectations of the law. For instance, in January 2017, A stray air attack by
the Nigerian Air Force struck an IDP camp in Rann, Borno State, and killed over
50 civilians. Investigations into these incidents are usually postponed, not
transparent, or yield minimal accountability.
Banditry and Communal Violence: Widespread armed banditry and
communal violence in the Northwest have spawned intricate humanitarian crises.
These conflicts, although criminal, frequently obscure the threshold of NIAC
when groups employ protracted violence and territorial control. Civilians are
routinely attacked, displaced, and their belongings plundered, and local
vigilante groups occasionally further obscure the civilian-combatant divide.
Institutional and Structural Challenges
Various reasons impede the comprehensive application of IHL in Nigeria's NIACs:
·
Ineffective Accountability Mechanisms: Investigations of civilian
harm are generally not independent and do not deliver justice for victims.
· Humanitarian Access Constraints: Insecurity and administrative
constraints regularly restrict humanitarian agencies' access to affected
communities.
·
Training and Capacity Gaps: While Nigerian troops have received
training on IHL from international partners, gaps in operational compliance and
command responsibility exist.
· Legal Pluralism and Fragmentation: Local religious and customary
practices in Northern Nigeria influence conflict dynamics, at times contrary to
standard formal legal institutions.
Emerging Good Practices
Despite these challenges, there have been some positive gains:
· The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) between Nigeria and the
surrounding states has coordinated regional reactions to Boko Haram while
committing to follow IHL standards.
·
The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) is ever more active in
documenting abuses and advocating for accountability.
·
Civil society organizations,
media, and communities remain vital to reporting, monitoring, and calling for
reform.
Conclusion
The Nigerian experience underscores an intrinsic IHL tension:
robust legal norms do exist, yet effective protection hinges on political will,
institutional commitment, and genuine accountability. Protection of civilians
in Nigeria's NIACs requires sustained effort to transition from legal
requirement to field practice. Increased IHL training for the military,
independent examination of civilian casualties, and Community-based protection
initiatives are the next critical steps. As increasingly internal and protracted
wars rend the world, Nigerian experiences teach us that it is not merely a
legal imperative to maintain the humanity of war, but a moral imperative.